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This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six 
different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of 
heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional 
settings in which treaty formations take place and/or different designs of agreements. 
We consider open and restricted open membership game as well as four exclusive 
membership games with different degrees of unanimity required to form coalitions. 
From a policy perspective, counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under 
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unanimity. We discuss the policy implications of our result for future treaty-making. 
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1. Introduction 
The game theoretical analysis of the formation and stability of international environmental 
agreements (IEAs) has become an important branch in the environmental economics literature 
over the last two decades. Roughly speaking, two approaches can be distinguished: repeated 
games and coalition games.
1 Repeated games analyze whether compliance with treaty 
obligations can be enforced in the long run with credible threats of punishment, invoking 
equilibrium concepts as for instance subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof equilibrium 
(Barrett 1994a, b, 1999, 2000, Endres/Finus 1998, Finus/Rundshagen 1998a, b, Finus/Tjotta 
2002, Mäler 1994 and Stähler 1996). Coalition games analyze membership in IEAs, applying 
concepts of cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The cooperative approach is based 
on the characteristic function that assigns a worth to coalitions. The worth is the aggregate 
payoff to a coalition that it can secure for itself irrespective of the behavior of countries 
outside the coalition. The focus of the analysis is on checking stability of the efficient grand 
coalition implementing a socially optimal emission vector, invoking the concept of the core 
(Chander/Tulkens 1995, 1997, Germain/Tulkens/de Zeeuw 1998 and Tulkens 1998). The 
efficient solution is stable (i.e., lies in the core) if no subgroup of countries has an incentive to 
form an other coalition, assuming that remaining countries break up into singletons playing 
either a minimax, maximin or Nash equilibrium strategy. In contrast, the non-cooperative 
approach is based on the valuation function that assigns an individual payoff to each country 
for each possible partition of countries, called coalition structure. For a fixed coalition 
structure payoffs follow from some assumption how countries choose their emissions. The 
standard assumption is that coalition members act as a single player maximizing the aggregate 
payoff to their coalition but behave non-cooperatively towards outsiders (see section 2). 
Equilibrium coalition structures are determined by applying the concept of internal and 
external stability (Barrett 1994b, 1997, Bauer 1992, Carraro/Siniscalco 1993, Hoel 1992, 
Hoel/Schneider 1997 Jeppesen/Andersen 1998 and Rubio/Ulph 2001). Internal stability 
means that no coalition member has an incentive to leave its coalition to become a singleton 
and external stability that no singleton has an incentive to join a coalition, assuming that the 
remaining countries do not revise their membership decision. Except Bauer (1992) all 
contributions have restricted coalition formation to a single coalition, allowing to group 
countries into signatories and non-signatories.  
                                                 
1   For an overview of different approaches see Finus (2001 and 2003).   2
Recently, there has been a development of new approaches and concepts in game theory that 
we call "new coalition theory".
2 "New coalition theory" belongs to non-cooperative game 
theory and is based on the valuation function. Compared to the cooperative approach this has 
at least two advantages (see Bloch 1997). First, assuming that countries pursue their self-
interest as rational players, it seems natural to conclude that countries will base their decision 
of membership on individual payoffs and not on the aggregate payoff to their coalition even if 
transfers are possible. Second, the valuation function does better account for spillovers 
between countries and coalitions. Since spillovers are an important source for free-riding in 
international treaty formation, the non-cooperative approach is better suited to rationalize 
inefficient IEAs, which, of course, most treaties are. Compared to the concept of internal and 
external stability these new developments have the advantage that they do not restrict ex-ante 
coalition formation to a single non-trivial coalition
3 but allow for the co-existence of multiple 
coalitions. Moreover, they invoke stability concepts that consider not only deviations by 
single countries but also by subgroups of countries where subgroups must not necessarily 
form one new coalition as assumed by the core but may form any partition. Finally, compared 
to the "classical" cooperative and non-cooperative approaches, new coalition theory draws a 
conceptual line between the rules of coalition formation (summarized in the definition of a 
coalition game) and stability (summarized in the definition of an equilibrium concept). Thus, 
differences in equilibrium coalitions can be unambiguously attributed to different stability 
concepts and different rules of coalition formation. Since the rules of coalition formation can 
be interpreted as the institutional setting in which treaty formation take place (Ecchia/Mariotti 
1998), policy conclusions about the optimal design of agreements are possible. Moreover, the 
reaction of countries after a deviation do not follow from ad hoc assumptions but follow from 
the rules of coalition formation and can therefore be related to the rational behavior of 
countries.  
This paper is in the tradition of new coalition theory and considers six different rules of 
coalition formation. Those rules allow for a comparison between open versus restricted open 
membership, open and restricted open versus exclusive membership and in the case of 
exclusive membership between different degrees of unanimity required to form coalitions. 
From a policy perspective counterintuitively, it turns out that stability is higher under 
                                                 
2   For an excellent overview see Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997). Applications in the context of IEAs 
may be found in Carraro (2000), Carraro/Marchiori (2002), Carraro/Marchiori/Oreffice (2001), 
Finus (2002) and Finus/Rundshagen (2001). 
3   A non-trivial coalition means a coalition of at least two countries.   3
exclusive than under open membership and stability increases with the degree of unanimity. 
Moreover, we argue that restricted open membership is better suited than open membership to 
depict treaty-formation and has also theoretical advantages. In contrast to other papers, we are 
not interested in characterizing equilibria in economic and ecological terms (see the applied 
literature cited in footnote 2) since the purpose of this paper is to compare stability under very 
general conditions for single and multiple deviations. In what follows, we present our model 
in section 2, compare stability in section 3, and conclude with some remarks in section 4. 
2. Model 
2.1 Introduction   
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage countries decide on 
their membership in a coalition, in the second stage coalition members choose their emissions. 
The decision in the first stage depends on the rules of coalition formation that follow from the 
definition of a coalition game. The definition comprises three elements: 1) the set of players 
I={1, …, N} with a particular player denoted by index i or j, 2) the set of coalition or 
membership strategies  12 ... N Σ =Σ ×Σ × ×Σ  with a particular strategy of country i  denoted 




i σ∈ Σ ψ that maps membership strategies   
into coalition structures,  . A coalition structure c  is a 
partition of players where a particular coalition is denoted by  , 




1 ,...,c :C , ψΣ → σ   ( ψ σ ) =
,...,
k c k {1 ∈ ,   
" kπl,  and 
kl cc ∩= ∅
i ∪c = I cC ∈  where C is the set of all possible coalition structures. The decision 
in the second stage depends on the rules of emission choices that follow from the definition of 
the valuation function. The valuation function w maps coalition structures into a vector of 
individual payoffs (i.e., welfare) via an instruction how countries choose their emissions 
,  , for a given coalition structure c. Hence, the valuation function is a 
composition of two functions   where 
ii eE ∈ E 1 ... N
w =π ε  
E =× E ×
:C E ε → ,  c( c ) ε  
π→
 is a function mapping 
coalition structures into a vector of emission levels and  ,   is a function 
mapping emission levels into welfare levels. 
N :E R e π   ( e )
For the first stage we consider six different coalition games, representing six different 
institutional rules how coalitions form. For the second stage we consider only one rule that 
assigns a unique vector of individual payoffs for each possible coalition structure. This 
implies that countries choosing a membership strategy in the first stage know for each 
coalition game the implications in the second stage. Hence, games can be solved by 
backwards induction. Consequently, we start in the following by describing first stage 2 and 
subsequently we move on to explain stage 1 of the coalition formation game.   4
2.2  Second Stage of the Coalition Formation Game 





(e ) ( e )
=
π= β − φ j ∑  
where we assume the following standard properties to hold (see, e.g., Folmer/van Mouche 
2000): " iŒI and e[ :  , 
max
ii 0 , e ∈ )
'
i 0 β> i 0
′′ β < ,  i 0
′ φ > ,  i 0
′′ φ ≥  where primes denote first and 
second derivative of a function. That is, benefits from emissions (in the form of consumption 
and production of goods),  , increase at a decreasing rate. Damages from global 
emissions, φ , increase in global emissions at a constant or increasing rate. Following 
the mainstream in the literature (e.g., Bloch 1997 and Yi 1997), we define the valuation 
function - mapping coalition structures into payoffs - as follows: 
ii (e ) β
j i1 e )
N
i ( = ∑
Definition 1: Valuation Function  
Fix a coalition structure  , let  =
1M c (c ,...,c ) w( c ) ={ }
i
i w(c;c) iŒI={ i(( c ) ) π ε }iŒI= 
{ } i(e ) π
∗
iŒI and assume for instruction ε  that all players belonging to a coalition  Œc 
jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition. Let e  denote the emission vector of 
coalition   and e  the emission vector of all other coalitions c Œc, , and assume that 
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k E :  ≥  where    is assumed to be a unique 

















Definition 1 implies that the valuation of country i,   is identified by the entire 
coalition structure c and not only by the coalition to which country i belongs.
i
i w( c; c )
4 Countries 
behave cooperatively within their coalition but non-cooperatively against countries belonging 
to other coalitions when choosing their emissions. Put differently, members of a coalition act 
as one single player maximizing the aggregate welfare to their coalition and coalitions play a 
Nash equilibrium strategy in terms of emissions. Consequently, the singleton coalition 
structure (grand coalition) implies an equilibrium emission vector corresponding to the 
"classical" Nash equilibrium (social optimum). Uniqueness of the emission vector e  for each 
coalition structure cŒC is related to the properties of the benefit and damage cost functions 
and follows from standard theorems. The assumption of an interior equilibrium eases 
*
                                                 
4   Of course, it would be sufficient to write only  , but it turns out that   is more 
convenient for later proofs. 
i w( c )
i
i w( c; c )  5
establishing a fundamental feature of coalition formation in the context of IEAs that we call 
positive externality property and define and prove in Proposition 1.  
In the case of transfers   where   implies to receive a transfer and 
 to pay a transfer. Typically, transfers follow from some assumption how coalitions 
share the gains from cooperation. For instance, in the context of the core the 
Chander/Tulkens´ transfer scheme (Chander/Tulkens 1995 and 1997) and in the context of 
internal&external stability the Shapley value (Botteon/Carraro 1997 and Barrett 1997) has 
been applied. Both transfer schemes assume that transfers are only exchanged between 
coalition members and that transfers balance, i.e., 
ii




i i ict ∈
i t <
= ∑ . For our purpose it suffices to 
show that there is a class of transfer schemes that preserves the positive externality property. 
For establishing this property, we need two lemmas. 
Lemma 1: Merging of Coalitions and Global Emissions  
Let a coalition structure with M coalitions be denoted by c , a coalition 
structure with M-1 coalitions by c  where c  is derived by merging two 
coalitions in c, and denote total emissions by  , then  .
=
1M (c ,...,c )
<
T* ' T* e( c )e( c
− =






i i1 ee )
5 
Proof: Let c  and c  be two coalitions that merge and   a coalition that is not involved in 
the merger. Assume   instead of e(  would be true after coalitions 
 and c  have merged. Then, given the assumptions of the valuation function (Definition 1) 
and the assumptions about the properties of the benefit and damage cost functions, the 
following must be true: 
i j k c
T* e(
T* T* ´ e( c )e( c ) <




"  : 
k kc ∈ kk
'' ' *T *T * ´
kk k k kk kc kc (e (c)) (e (c)) (e (c )) (e (c )) ∈∈ φ ≤ φ = β ∑∑
´ **






                                                
 ⇒    
" iŒcc : β=  
ij ∪ iij
'' ' ' *T *T *
ii i i j ic ic jc (e (c)) (e (c)) (e (c)) (e (c)) ∈∈∈ φ < φ + φ ∑∑∑
ij
'' T* ´ T* ´ * ´
ii ic jc (e (c )) (e (c )) (e (c )) ∈∈ φ+ φ= β ∑∑ i
**
ii e( c ) e( c) >  ⇒    
which obviously violates the initial assumption of e(  (Q.E.D.). 
T* T* ´ c )e( c ) <
Thus, Lemma 1 states that whenever singletons or non-trivial coalitions form a joint coalition, 
called a merger, global emissions will decrease. An immediate consequence of Lemma 1 is 
that the grand coalition implies the lowest and the singleton coalition structure the highest 
global emissions. Any coalition structure between these two benchmarks will imply lower 
 
5  For reference reason we mention that in the terminology of coalition theory coalition structure   
is called coarser than coalition structure c. 
´ c  6
global emissions than the singleton coalition structure but higher global emissions than the 
grand coalition. The next lemma looks at the reaction of outsiders to a merger.  
Lemma 2: Merging of Coalitions and Emissions of Outsiders 
Let   be a coalition that is not involved in a merger which implies that coalition structure c 
changes to coalition structure c  and denote emissions of a member of coalition   by   
then  . 
k c
e(
´ k c k e,
≤
**
kk c ) e( c)
´
'
Proof: From Lemma 1 we have e(  after a merger. Hence, the following must be 
true: "  :  ⇒  
T* T* ´ c )e( c ) >
'' *T
k (e (c)) φ ∑∑
k kc ∈ kk
' *T * ´
kk k kk kc kc (e (c)) (e (c )) (e (c )) ∈∈ β= ≤ φ = β
* ´ ´
kk e( c ) e( c ) ≤
     (Q.E.D.). 
Thus, Lemma 2 states that outsiders not involved in a merger will increase their emissions 




i 0 φ = ). Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 
allow stating the following result. 
Proposition 1a: Positive Externality Property (PEP): No Transfers 
Assume no transfers and let c  be a coalition not involved in a merger which implies that 
coalition structure c changes to coalition structure c , then in the global emission game 






kk w( c; c ) w( c;
'
Proof: Global emissions decrease after a merger by Lemma 1 and outsiders emission increase 
or remain unchanged by Lemma 2, hence benefits of outsiders increase or remain unchanged 
and their damage costs decrease. Consequently, outsiders´ welfare must increase through a 
merger (Q.E.D.). 
The striking feature about Proposition 1a is that in the global emission game the PEP holds at 
a very general level, that is, for any type of welfare function and any type of heterogeneity 
between countries. The PEP has an immediate implication for stability of coalition structures 
in the various coalition games considered in the next subsection: if a country or group of 
countries change their membership strategy, that is, they leave their coalition, join an other 
coalition or form their own coalition, the harshest possible punishment is that all coalitions of 
the remaining countries break up into singletons. We will discuss this issue in more detail in 
section 3 and turn now to transfers.  
For our level of generality it suffices to show that there exist a transfer scheme for which the 
PEP holds. We consider a modification of the transfer scheme proposed by Chander/Tulkens 
(1995 and 1997) which comes close to that applied in Eyckmans/Tulkens (1999):   7
[2]    ii
ii
ii i i i i ic ic t w (c ;c) w ({i};(1,...,1) w (c ;c) w ({i};(1,...,1)) ∈∈   =− − +λ −   ∑∑  
where   are distributional weights, 01 i λ i < λ< and  i i ic 1 ∈ λ = ∑ , so that transfers balance 
within coalition  . The first term in brackets puts each country back to its payoff in the 
singleton coalition structure c=(1,...,1), corresponding to the classical Nash equilibrium. The 
second term gives each member of coalition   a portion of the total gains (or losses) to this 
coalition from moving from the singleton coalition structure to coalition structure c. Losses 
cannot be generally ruled out since if some countries form a coalition, external countries may 
adjust their emissions upward according to Lemma 2. If this leakage effect is strong enough, 
cooperation may not be beneficial (for the entire coalition).
i c
i c
6 However, this does not affect the 
PEP as shown below. 
Proposition 1b: Positive Externality Property (PEP): Transfers 
Assume transfer scheme [2] for all iŒI , let  = +
ii
ii ˆ c;c) w(c;c) t




w(  and let   be a coalition 
not involved in a merger, which implies that coalition structure c changes to coalition 




kk ˆˆ w( c;
Proof: Computing   for [2] gives   
. Since   is unaffected by a 
merger and   increases through a merger by Proposition 1a,   increases 
through an external merger (Q.E.D.) 
kk
kk ˆ w( c; c ) w( c; c ) t =
kk k kcw ({k};(1,...,1))) ∈∈ ∑∑
c)
k
kk ˆ w (c ;c) w ({k};(1,...,1)) =+
(1,...,1))
k
k ˆ w (c ;c)
k
kk kc ( w (c ;c) λ−
k
k w (c ;
k w ({k};
From the proof it is evident that there are many transfer schemes that preserve the PEP. For 
instance, [2] measures the gains or losses compared to the singleton coalition structure. 
However, any other benchmark is also fine as long as it is a fixed benchmark. The weights  i λ  
may be derived from any allocation rule as long as weights are not dependent on the partition 
of external players  .
i I\c
7 
2.3  First Stage of the Coalition Formation Games 
In this subsection we define and discuss six coalition games that imply different rules how 
coalitions can form. All games assume that countries simultaneously announce their coalition 
                                                 
6   Technically speaking, this implies that superadditivity may not hold in our context. Only for 
linear damage cost functions there are no leakages and hence superadditivity generally holds. 
7    In Chander/Tulkens (1995 and 1997) weights are related to marginal damage costs (i.e., 
; notation of Lemma 1) and hence merging of coalitions generally 
affects weights. Thus, general conclusions about PEP are only possible for the special case of 
linear damage cost functions (and of course symmetric players).  
i
´T * ´T *
ii i ic (e )/ (e ) ∈ λ= φ φ ∑  8
strategy and allow for the co-existence of several coalitions. That is, coalition formation is not 
ex-ante restricted to a single coalition as this is assumed for the concepts of internal&external 
stability and the core that have been widely applied in the literature on IEAs.
8 However, 
games differ in the strategy set and most importantly in the coalition function that maps 
coalition strategies into coalition structures. From the discussion it will be apparent that there 
are two important features in which games differ. The first feature is membership where we 
distinguish between open and exclusive membership. Open membership means that countries 
can join any coalition they want whereas exclusive membership implies that this is only 
possible with the consent of the members of a coalition. The second feature is the degree of 
unanimity required to form a coalition. We distinguish four variants: weak, middle, strong and 
super strong.  
The first game is called open membership game (OMG) and is due to Yi/Shin (1995). In this 
game countries can freely form coalitions as long as no outsider is excluded from joining a 
coalition. Countries choose their membership by announcing an address, i.e., a number 
between 1 and N. Countries that have announced the same address form a coalition. For 
instance, suppose N=4 and σ=  and  123 1 σ= σ= 4 2 σ = , then c={{1, 2, 3}, {4}} forms. If 




Definition 2: Open Membership Game (OMG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of country iŒI is given by   where a particular 
strategy 
= i {1,...,N } Σ
i σ  is an announcement of an address. 
b) Coalition function   maps strategy vector 
OMG ψ σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
i c{ i = }  »  Ô {j = ij } σ σ .
 
Thus in the OMG a country can join any coalition it wants. This strong assumption, however, 
seems not entirely in line with the notion of voluntary participation in IEAs that is one 
important feature reminiscent to the problem of cooperation in international pollution control. 
Hence, it seems natural to consider an extension of the OMG where countries have only 
unrestricted open access to non-trivial coalitions but require the consent of a single country if 
they intend to join it. This extension is called a restricted open membership game (ROMG). It 
                                                 
8   See the literature cited in the Introduction. 
9   The rule of this game is similar to internal&external stability, except that in the open membership 
game multiple coalitions may form. For details see Finus/Rundshagen (2001).   9
has been proposed by Bloch (1997) and formalized by Rundshagen (2002). Conceptually, 
only a slight modification of Definition 2 is required, adding to the strategy set an address 0 
and specifying the coalition function such that countries announcing 0 remain singletons. 
Definition 3:  Restricted Open Membership Game (ROMG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies set of country iŒI is given by   where a 
particular strategy 
i {0,1,...,N } Σ =
i σ  is an announcement of an address. 
b) Coalition function   maps strategy vector 
ROMG ψ σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
i c{ i = }  »  Ô .  {j ij 0} σσ =≠
For instance, recall our previous example that assumed  123 1 σ =σ =σ =  and σ= so that 
c={{1, 2, 3}, {4}} forms and where we argued that if country 3 changed its address to  , 
then c={{1, 2}, {3, 4}} will come about. In the ROMG player 4 can announce σ= instead 
of   so that no other player can force him into a coalition. However, also in the ROMG, 
any player not in coalition {1, 2, 3} can join this coalition. This is different in the next four 





In the exclusive membership D-game (EMDG), which is due to Hart/Kurz (1983), countries 
announce a list of countries with which they like to form a coalition. Those countries that 
announce the same list will form a coalition. For instance, suppose N=4 and  , 
,   and  , then 
1 {1, 2, 3} σ=
2 {1, 2, 3} σ= 3 {3} σ= 4 { 1 ,2 ,3 ,4 } σ= c {{1, 2},{3},{4}} =  forms. Countries 1 and 
2 propose the same list and therefore form a coalition. Countries 3 and 4 remain singletons. 
Though country 4 would like to form a coalition with all other countries, country 3 can remain 
a singleton and country 1 and 2 form their own coalition since membership is exclusive. In 
other words, a coalition only forms by unanimous agreement. More formally, we have: 
Definition 4: Exclusive Membership D-Game (EMDG) 






i σ   is a list of countries with which country i would like to form a 
coalition. 
b) Coalition function   maps strategy vector 
EM G ∆ ψ σ  into coalition structure c as follows: 
=
i c{ i }   » {j˙  = ij } σ σ . 
As it will turn out from a comparison with other exclusive membership games below, in the 
EMDG only a weak degree of unanimity is required to form a coalition.    10
The exclusive membership Γ-game (EMGG) goes back to Von Neumann/Morgenstern (1944) 
and has been reintroduced by Hart/Kurz (1983) under this name. This game is identical to the 
last game in terms of strategies but different in terms of the coalition function. Whereas in the 
EMDG it suffices that a subgroup of countries on a list makes the same proposal (and hence 
the subgroup forms a coalition), in the EMGG a coalition forms if and only if all members on 
a list make the same proposal. That is, the degree of unanimity to form a coalition in the 
EMGG is higher than in the EMDG. For instance, suppose our previous example in the 
context of the EMDG that assumed  ,  ,   and  , 
which led to coalition structure c
1 {1, 2, 3} σ=
{{1,
2 {1, 2, 3} σ=
2},{3},{4}}
3 {3} σ= 4 {1, 2, 3, 4} σ=
= , whereas now it implies 
. If and only if country 1 and 2 were to announce σ=  would 
they form a coalition. More formally, we define: 
c {{1},{2},{3},{4}} = 12 {1, 2} σ=
Definition 5: Exclusive Membership G-Game (EMGG) 






i σ  is a list of countries with which country i would like to form a 
coalition. 
b) Coalition function   maps strategy vector 
EM G Γ ψ σ  into coalition structure c as follows:  
=
i
i c σ  if and only if  = ij σ σ  " j Œ  i σ , otherwise c .  =
i { i }
k  
In comparison to the subsequent games we call this a middle degree of unanimity to form a 
coalition. 
The exclusive membership H-game (EMHG) has been invented by Finus/Rundshagen (2003) 
and implies a modification not only in terms of the coalition function but also in terms of 
strategies compared to the EMDG and EMGG. In terms of coalition strategies, countries´ 
announcements comprise not only a list of countries with which they would like to form a 
coalition but also a list with their preferred residual coalition structure. The coalition function 
determines coalition structure c not in one but in two steps. The first step resembles that in the 
EMGG: countries which have each other on the list to form a coalition will be in one coalition 
if and only if all members on a list make the same proposal. This leads to a "preliminary" 
coalition structure  . The second step requires that all members belonging to coalition c  in 
 have correctly announced the external coalitions   forming in   otherwise   splits 
up into singletons in the "final" coalition structure c. For instance, suppose N=5 and the 
following announcements:  , 
c   i  
c  




i c  
5}} 12 {{1, 2}, {3},{ σ= σ= 34 { 2},{3,4},{ σ =σ =  and 
. Thus, in the first step, preliminary coalition structure 
 forms since countries 1 and 2 and 3 and 4 propose exactly the same list 
5 {{1,2}, σ=




5 }} c    11
with which countries they would like to form a coalition. In the second step final coalition 
structure   follows since only countries 3 and 4 announcement 
materializes in c. More specifically:
c {{1},{2},{3,4},{5}} =
 
== i c(i) (c σ





j c  
                   
Definition 6: Exclusive Membership H-Game (EMHG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of country iŒI is given by  Œ /iŒ  where a 
particular strategy   of country i is composed of a list of 
countries with which it wants to form a coalition,  , and its preferred residual coalition 
structure, c . 
= i {c(i) Σ C
1 c( i) }
i M 12 (i);c (i),...,c (i))
1 c (i)
b) Coalition function   determines coalition structure c from strategy vector σ  in two 
steps as follows. 
First, a preliminary coalition structure   is determined: iŒ  if only if 
  " jŒc
=
1M c (c ,...,c )
      
1 c  
=
1 c( i) c(
1(i) , otherwise  ={i}.  
1 c  
Second, final coalition structure   follows from:  =
12 M (c ,c ,...,c )
j c   Œc  c(i) " iŒ  ⇔ c = 
j c   , 
otherwise   splits up into singletons in c. 
Thus, the whole coalition formation process can be interpreted as follows. In the first step it is 
checked whether "internal lists" match, that is, lists of countries with which a country wants 
to form a coalition. The preliminary formation process requires a degree of unanimity of the 
G-type. In the second step it is checked whether "external lists" match, that is, lists of 
partitions formed by external countries. Here, only lists of members in the same coalition but 
not of all countries must match to form a coalition. This implies de facto that a degree of 
unanimity of the D-type with respect to the external list is required to form a coalition. This 
suggests that a game can be constructed which also requires a degree of unanimity of the G-
type for the external list. This is done below. For reference reason we call the degree of 
unanimity required to form a coalition in terms of the entire EMHG "strong" in order to 
distinguish it from that in the next game that we call "super strong". 
The exclusive membership I-game (EMIG) is due to Finus/Rundshagen (2003) and is identical 
to the EMHG in terms of strategies but different in terms of the coalition function. In this 
game not only must all members of a coalition propose the same external list but all countries 
to form coalitions. Thus, taken together, a coalition only forms if and only if all countries 
make the same proposal for the entire coalition structure, comprising an internal and external 
                              
10   There is a close resemblance between core-stability and a strong Nash equilibrium in this game. 
For details see Finus/Rundshagen (2003).    12
list. For instance, reconsider the example in the context of the EMHG that assumed N=5 and 
announcements  ,  12 {{1, 2}, {3},{4},{5}} σ= σ= 34 {{1,2},{3,4},{5}} σ =σ =
},{3,4},{5}}
 and   
 and where in the H-game c
5 {{1,2}, σ=
{3,4,5}} {{1},{2 =  formed. In contrast, in the EMIG 
 because not all announcements with respect to the external list 
match. Formally, the coalition function determines coalition structures in one step: 
c {{1},{ = 2},{3},{4},{5}}
Definition 7: Exclusive Membership I-Game (EMIG) 
a) The set of coalition strategies of country iŒI is given by  ŒC /iŒ  where a 
particular strategy   of country i is composed of a list of 
countries with which it wants to form a coalition,  , and its preferred residual coalition 
structure, c . 




i c(i) (c (i);c (i),...,c (i)) σ
1 c (i)
i M c (i)
2(i),...,
b) Coalition function   determines coalition structure c from strategy vector 
EMIG ψ σ  as 
follows: 
= c c(i) if and only if  = ij σ σ  " iŒI, otherwise  = c (1,...,1). 
After the discussion of how coalitions form in the various coalition games, we can now turn to 
analyze stability.  
3.  Stability of Coalition Structures 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section we compare stability of coalition structures in the six coalition games. We 
consider two equilibrium concepts: Nash equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium. A Nash 
equilibrium coalition structure, abbreviated NE, is derived from a vector of coalition 
strategies   where no single country has an incentive to change its strategy (announcement), 
given that other countries announce their equilibrium strategy. This is the familiar definition 
of Nash equilibrium, except that strategies are coalition and not economic (i.e., emission) 
strategies. Similar, a strong Nash equilibrium coalition structure, abbreviated SNE, is a vector 
of coalition strategies where no subgroup of countries I
* σ
SÃI has an incentive to change its 
coalition strategy. Formally, we have:   13
Definition 8: Nash and Strong Nash Equilibrium Coalition Structures
11 
Let C(
S I ˆ ) σ  be the set of coalition structures that a subgroup of countries I
S can induce if the 
remaining countries j∈ I\I
S play 
S I\I σ . Then 
* σ , inducing coalition structure  , is called a 
SNE if no subgroup I
* c
S can increase its members´ payoff by inducing another coalition 
structure  ∈  ˆ c
S I * ˆ ) C( σ . That is, 
* c(
* ) σ  is a SNE if there is no I
S⊂I and a coalition structure 
∈  ˆ c
S I * ˆ C( ) σ  such that   " iŒI
i ) w( ≥
i *
ii ˆˆ w(c,c ,c ) c
S and $ jŒI
S: 
j j*
jj ˆˆ w( c, c ) c, c) > w( . For 
a NE, 
S I {i = }. 
Given that multiple deviations are a special case of single deviations (I
S={i}), it is evident that 
the set of SNE is a subset of NE, C . The reason why we consider not only SNE but 
also NE is that existence of NE is guaranteed under far more general conditions than of SNE. 
Since some of the proofs in subsection 3.2 are instructive for establishing existence of 
equilibrium coalition structures in the various coalition games, we postpone the discussion 
until subsection 3.3. 
SNE NE C ⊂
3.2  Comparison of Equilibrium Coalition Structures  
For the analysis of stability it is helpful to note four things in advance. First, stability is 
defined in terms of incentives to induce other coalition structures. Possible inducements 
follow from the rules of coalition formation and may be broken down in two components. 
a) The deviations that are available to a country or group of countries if they change their 
coalition strategies. This direct effect comprises the possibility of deviators forming new 
coalitions and/or joining other coalitions. b) The reaction to a deviation of those countries not 
(actively) involved in a deviation. This indirect effect comprises reactions ranging from no 
reaction to the resolution of all partitions to which non-deviating countries belong. Second, 
trivially, when checking stability of coalition structure c, we are only interested in changes of 
strategies that will have an effect on c. Third, when comparing SNE in the various games, we 
only have to consider deviations by a true subgroup of countries I
S
≠ ⊂I since deviations by all 
countries can induce any coalition structure in every game. Thus, if there are differences in 
stability in the various games, they must stem from the possibilities that are available to 
subgroups of countries. Fourth, several coalition strategy vectors may lead to the same 
                                                 
11    We define strong Nash equilibrium in terms of a weak inequality to be consistent with the 
definition of Pareto-optimal coalition structures in subsection 3.3. A modification of this 
assumption would not affect the subsequent proofs.   14
coalition structure.
12 Hence, when analyzing stability of a coalition structure, it suffices that 
stability holds for one coalition strategy vector. Since the most favorable condition for 
stability in the exclusive membership D- and G-game is if each coalition member proposes 
exactly this coalition to which it belongs in c and in the exclusive membership H- and I-game 
if each country announces exactly coalition structure c, our proofs start from this assumption. 
In the following we proceed in three steps to derive our final result. First, we compare 
equilibrium coalition structures in the open membership game (OMG), restricted open 
membership game (ROMG) and in the exclusive membership D-game (EMDG) since these 
three games differ only in the direct but not in the indirect effect of deviations. Second, we 
compare equilibrium coalition structures in the exclusive membership D-, G- and H-game 
(EMDG, EMGG and EMHG) since these games do not differ in the direct but in the indirect 
effect. Third, we contrast equilibrium coalition structures in the exclusive membership H-
game with those in exclusive membership I-game (EMIG) since these games differ only in the 
direct effect. We immediately start with the first comparison. 
Proposition 2: Comparison of Equilibria in the OMG, ROMG and EMDG 
Let the set of Nash and strong Nash equilibrium coalition structures (NE and SNE) in the 
OMG, ROMG and EMDG be denoted by   and   respectively, then 
NE C (...)
SNE C (...)
a)  Ã Ã
NE C( O M G ) ) )
NE C( R O M G
NE C( E M G ∆  and 
b)  Ã Ã
SNE C( O M G ) ) )
SNE C( R O M G
SNE C( E M G ∆ . 
Proof: First we show  that if c∉C( , then c∉ . Suppose 
, then there exists a group of countries I
SNE R O M G
i
i w( c; c ) ≥
) )
SNE C( O M G
S jI :
j´ ´ w( c; c)
1M c (c ,...,c ) =∉
SNE C (ROMG)
S I´ σ
SS ´´ I ´ I \ I * cc (, ) =σσ
S⊂I and a set of 
announcements   such that   " iŒI
i´ ´
i w( c; c)
S and   
holds where  . Since |
∃∈
j
jj w( c; c ) >
Σ|=N there exists 
S I´ ´ S I 0i σ ≠∀ ∈
S { i }
 in the OMG leading 
to  ) so that  . Hence   can also be induced in the OMG and 
c∉  follows. For a NE, the same reasoning applies with I
SS I\I * , σ
)
´´ ´´ I ´´ cc ( =σ
SNE C( O M
´´ ´ cc =
´ c
G = . 
Second we show that if c∉C(
SNE E M G ) ∆ , then c∉C( . Suppose 
, then there exists a group of countries I
SNE R O M G
j
j w( c; c )
)
)
                                                
1M c (c ,...,c ) =∉
i´ ´
i w( c; c) w( ≥
´S 1 cc ( c =∪
SNE C( E M G ∆
i
i c; c )
S ( I \ I
S⊂I for which 
  " i ŒI
S and    holds where 
)) ∪…∪ (  and   is a partition of I
S jI ∃∈




j w( c; c)>
1L SS c ,...,c ) ∩
M c( ∩ (
S with c  a  i S
 
12   For instance, in the open membership game announcements  12 1 σ =σ =
12
 and σ=  lead to the 
same coalition structure c=({1,2}, {3}) as announcements 
2 2
2 σ =σ =  and σ=. Note, 
however, that in each coalition game each strategy vector leads to a unique coalition structure. 
2 3  15
particular coalition in c . Since c  can also be induced in the ROMG (by countries i∈  
changing their announcements to   and 
S ´ i S c
i S 0 σ≠ i S j σ ≠σ
{ i }
  ), c∉  follows. 
For a NE, the same reasoning applies with 
i S jc ∀∉
SNE C( R O M G )























( 1 ) ´ T ( 2 ) ´ R ´ , c , c )
≠ ⊂
R
The intuition of Proposition 2 is the following. In all three games the indirect effect of a 
deviation is the same. If in the OMG and ROMG deviating countries change their address all 
other countries remain in their coalitions. In the EMDG the deviating countries change their 
list of countries with which they like to form a coalition. Due to weak unanimity to form 
coalitions, other countries will remain in their coalitions if some countries change their list. 
However, the three games differ in their direct effect. The direct effect comprises that 
deviators form their own partition or a partition with other countries not actively involved in a 
deviation. The latter effect implies to join other coalitions. In the OMG any possible deviation 
is available to a subgroup of countries, in the ROMG deviators cannot join singletons without 
their consent and in the EMDG deviators can neither join singletons nor non-trivial coalitions 
without their consent. Thus, it is easier to sustain a NE or SNE in the EMDG than in the 
ROMG since the amount of possible deviations is smaller in the former than in the latter 
game, anything else being equal. The same is true when comparing ROMG and OMG. We 
now turn to the second comparison. 
Proposition 3: Comparison of Equilibria in the EMDG, EMGG and EMHG 
Let the set of Nash and strong Nash equilibrium coalition structures (NE and SNE) in the 
EMDG, EMGG and EMHG be denoted by   and  , respectively, then  
a)  Ã Ã  and  
NE C( E M G ∆ )
)
R ´
NE E MG Γ
b)  Ã Ã . 
SNE C( E M G ∆ E M Γ
Proof: Suppose in the EMDG and EMGG that each country announces exactly those countries 
with which it forms a coalition in c and in the EMHG each country announces exactly 






I. Let   be the initial coalition structure and   the resulting 
coalition structure after deviation.   is the partition of deviators I
TR c( c , c =
´T c
c
T1 L c (c ,...,c ) =
S⊂I
T I in   that 




S in   that 
belonged to partition c  in c, and   is the partition of all remaining countries I\I
T before and 
 after the deviation. In the EMDG and EMGG a deviation has no effect on   and hence 
. In the EMDG a deviation implies that those coalitions to which the deviators belong 
stick together whereas in the EMGG they break up into singletons by the stronger degree of 
unanimity required forming a coalition. Thus, if we let  , then in the EMDG 
c
c  16
T(2)´ 1 T S L T S c c (I \I ) ... c (I \I ) =∩ ∪ ∪∩
i I j ∀
RR ´ cc =  
T(2)´ c (1,...,1) =
R´ c (1,....,1) =
i T(1) ´ T(1)´ cc ∈ i T(1) ´ T(1)´ T(2)´ R´
i w( c ;c , c ,c
i´ T(1)´ T(2)´
i w (c ;c ,c (1,...,1), =
R´ c (1,...., =
SNE C( E M G ) ∆
 whereas in the EMGG  . In the EMHG 
a deviation by a subgroup of countries I
T(2)´ c (1,...,1) =
T(1)´  
T(2)´ (1,...,1) =  




T leads to intended partition c  in the first step 
of the coalition function if ∀∈ . However, all coalitions to which 
the deviators belonged will break up into singletons in   because their announcements do not 
match anymore. Thus, in the first step of the coalition function c . In the second 
step, all countries belonging to other coalitions (partition  ) will break up into 
singletons since those countries must have initially (before the deviation) announced the 
correct coalition structure that formed in c otherwise they would not have been in coalitions 
in c. Now their announcements do not match anymore and hence those coalitions in partition 
 break apart in the second step of the coalition function. Hence,   
with   and  .
Sk kk c( i ) : c( i ) c( j ) ∈ =




i w (c ;c ,c
1))
SNE E M G )
´T ( 1 ) ´ T ( 2 ) ´ R c, c , c
i T(1) ´ ∈
´ )
13 Taken together, we have for a deviator ic , 
:  ≥ ≥  ( =
Γ
SNE C( E M G ) Η
NE(
NE C( E MG ) Η
NE C (EMIG)
                                                
...)
SNE(...)
SNE C( E M G ) Η
SNE C( E M I G )
 
T(1)´ c




 after the deviation due to the positive externality 
property. Hence,  ÃC( Ã . For NE, the same 
reasoning applies with I
S={i} (Q.E.D.). 
In all three games the direct effect of deviations is the same: deviators cannot join other 
coalitions due to exclusivity and the partition that a group of countries can form is the same. 
However, the indirect effect is different since the various degrees of unanimity required to 
form a coalition imply different reactions of the remaining players. In the EMDG there is no 
reaction, in the EMGG coalitions to which the deviators belonged break apart, and in the 
EMHG, additionally, all other coalitions break apart. Thus, the higher the degree of unanimity 
necessary to form coalitions, the higher is the implicit punishment in positive externality 
games after a deviation and hence the higher is the "degree of stability". We turn now to the 
last comparison. 
Proposition 4: Comparison of Equilibria in the EMHG and EMIG 
Let the set of Nash and strong Nash equilibrium coalition structures (NE and SNE) in the 
EMHG and EMIG be denoted by C  and C , respectively, then  
a)  =  and b)  Ã .  
13   Of course, partition   will only form if all deviators I
S correctly announce partition c  and 
 in  . If not, then   would break up into singletons, leading to c , which can 
also be induced by a single deviation.   17
Proof: According to the proof of Proposition 3, in the EMHG multiple deviations from 
coalition structure c lead to   which in terms of a single deviation implies 
 and thus  . In the EMIG any deviation by a subgroup of countries I
´T ( 1 ) ´ c (c ,1,...,1) =
1)
T(1)´ c ={ i }
´ c (1,..., =
S
≠ ⊂I 
leads to the complete resolution of all coalition structures including the partition of deviating 
countries since coalition strategies do not match anymore and hence  . Thus, in 
terms of single deviation there is no difference between both games but in terms of multiple 
deviations: any partition that can be induced by I
´ c (1,...,1) =
S in the EMIG can also be induced in the 
EMHG but not vice versa (Q.E.D.).  
Summarizing Proposition 2, 3 and 4 gives our central result: 
Proposition 5: Comparison of Equilibria in All Coalition Formation Games 
Let   and   denote the set of Nash equilibrium (NE) and strong Nash 
equilibrium (SNE) coalition structures in the open membership game (OMG), the restricted 
open membership game (ROMG), and the exclusive membership D-,  G-,  H, and I-game 
(EMDG, EMGG, EMHG and EMIG), respectively, then  
NE C (...)
SNE C (...)
a)  Ã Ã
NE C( O M G ) ) )
NE C( R O M G
NE C( E M G ∆ Ã Ã  
 and  
NE C( E MG Γ )
) ) )
=
NE C( E M H G )
NE C (EMIG)
b)  Ã Ã
SNE C( O M G
SNE C( R O M G
SNE C( E M G ∆ Ã Ã 
Ã . 
SNE C( E M G Γ )
)
SNE C( E M H G )
NE C( E M I G
Proof: Follows from Proposition 2, 3 and 4 (Q.E.D.). 
Proposition 5 stresses the relation between the rules of coalition formation and stability of 
agreements with an unambiguous relation (inclusion chain) between equilibria in the various 
coalition games. 
3.3  Existence of Equilibrium Coalition Structures  
The reason for considering not only strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) but also Nash equilibrium 
(NE) coalition structures in the previous subsection is that - at our level of generality - 
existence of a NE is guaranteed in all games except in the open membership game whereas 
existence of a SNE can only be established in the exclusive membership I-game. We start 
establishing existence of a NE for which we need the following definition.   18
Definition 9:  Individually Rational Coalition Structures 
A coalition structure c is called individually rational if each player receives at least his payoff 
in the singleton coalition structure, i.e., " iŒI:  .   ≥
i
ii w (c ,c) w({i},1,...,1)
It is evident that the set of individually rational coalition structures, henceforth abbreviated 
, is non-empty since the singleton coalition structure belongs to this set by definition. 
Moreover, intuition suggests that there is a close relation between individually rational and 
Nash equilibrium coalition structures. 
IR C
Lemma 3:  Individually Rational and Nash equilibrium Coalition Structures  
In every coalition game a Nash equilibrium coalition structure must be individually rational, 
i.e., C Ã
NE IR C .  
Proof: Consider a coalition structure c  and suppose that country i is a member 
of coalition c . In each coalition game country i can induce a coalition structure of type 
 by changing its strategy (where  ). In the worst case   
because of the positive externality property (PEP). Hence, a coalition structure c can only be a 
NE if and only if ∀∈:  where   (Q.E.D.). 
1M (c ,...,c ) =
R =
i´
i w( { i } ; c)
1
R )
´ c( { i } , c
′ = cc \ { i
´ c (1 =
}
j
R c (1,...,1) =
iI i w( c; c )≥ ,....,1)
Using Lemma 3 and recalling the fact that the singleton coalition structure is individually 
rational by definition, it is evident that existence of a NE is guaranteed in the restricted open 
membership (ROMG) and the four exclusive membership games. If each country announces 
address   in the ROMG, then no country can unilaterally induce any other coalition 
structure. The same is true if each country announces a list with only itself in the exclusive 
membership D- and G-game and if each country announces the singleton coalition structure in 
the exclusive membership H- and I-game. Hence, we can state the following proposition 
without proof. 
i 0 σ=
Proposition 6:  Existence of Nash Equilibrium Coalition Structures 
In the restricted open membership game and the four exclusive membership games a Nash 
equilibrium coalition structure exists.  
However, in the open membership game a NE may not always exist. Suppose each country 
announces a different address, then an individual country i that has an incentive to join an 
other singleton j can deviate by announcing the same address,  i σ =σ . The resulting coalition 
structure is also unstable if country j prefers to stay alone. In any non-trivial coalition 
structure stability may also be a problem since basically any deviation is possible in the open   19
membership game.
14 This stresses that the restricted open membership does not only capture 
voluntary participation better but has also theoretical advantages compared to the open 
membership game. We now turn to SNE for which we need the following definition. 
Definition 10:  Pareto-optimal Coalition Structures 
A coalition structure c is Pareto-optimal if there is no other coalition structure   where at 
least one country is better off and no country worse off, i.e., there is no   such that 





ii w(c ,c ) w(c,c) >
j´ ´ j
jj c , c) w(c, c)
Definition 10 is the familiar definition of Pareto-optima, applied to the context of coalition 
formation. Henceforth, we abbreviate Pareto-optimal coalition structures by PO and denote its 
set by C . It is evident that the grand coalition is always a PO: it generates the highest global 
welfare and therefore in any other coalition structure at least one country must be worse off. 
Consequently,   is non-empty. Definition 10 suggests that there is a close relation between 






S=I. Hence, a necessary condition that a coalition structure is a SNE is that it is 
a PO, C . Moreover, recalling that   because multiple deviations include 
the special case of single deviations, I
⊂
SNE NE CC ⊂
NE S={i}, and that C Ã  from Lemma 2, it is apparent 
that we can state the following lemma (without proof). 
IR C
Lemma 4:  Pareto-optimal and Strong Nash Equilibrium Coalition Structures  
In every coalition game a strong Nash equilibrium coalition structure must be an individually 
rational and Pareto-optimal coalition structure, i.e., C Ã
SNE IR C «
PO C .  
From Lemma 4 we see that existence of a SNE faces two problems. First, not any PO is 
individually rational. For instance, as it is well known, in the absence of compensation 
payments the socially optimal solution, which corresponds to the grand coalition in our 
context, may not be individually rational if countries have heterogeneous payoff functions. Of 
course, this problem can be mitigated by a transfer scheme as for instance the one we 
proposed in subsection 2.2, which ensures that at least the grand coalition is individually 
rational (apart from the singleton coalition structure).
15 Second, not any PO is a SNE. Despite 
                                                 
14   An example of non-existence of a NE in the open membership game is provided in Yi/Shin 
(2000) in a theoretical context and in Eyckmans/Finus (2003) in an empirical context. In Yi/Shin 
(2000) conditions for existence are derived which are, however, very restrictive. 
15   Since the aggregate payoff in the grand coalition is higher than in any other coalition structure, 
individual rationality is ensured if each country receives a fraction of the gains from cooperation. 
However, in any other coalition structure it cannot be ruled out (except for linear damage cost   20
the fact that not all countries can benefit when moving from a PO to some other coalition 
structure, this may well be the case for a true subgroup I
S
≠ ⊂I. This is the reason why in many 
economic applications as well as in almost all coalition games analyzed in this paper a SNE 
may fail to exist. The only exception is the exclusive membership I-game. In the case of 
transfer scheme [2], this is easy to see. First, the grand coalition is individually rational and a 
PO. Second, any deviation by subgroup of countries I
S
≠ ⊂I leads to   and is 
therefore not beneficial. However, existence holds at a far more general level. 
´ c (1,...,1) =
Proposition 7:  Existence of SNE in the Exclusive Membership I-game 
There always exists a strong Nash equilibrium in the exclusive membership I-game.  
Proof: We proceed in two steps. First, we show that the set of individually rational Pareto-
optimal coalition structures is none empty, CC
IR PO ∩ ≠∅
(1,..., =
. Second, we demonstrate that 
. 1) Suppose that c  and recall that 
. Then,   is obvious. Alternatively, suppose  . 
Then, there exists a coalition structure   that Pareto-dominates c. If cC, we are done, if 
not, then there exists a coalition structure   that Pareto-dominates  . This process continues 
until a coalition structure is an element of C  (otherwise assumption   must 
be wrong). 2) Any deviation by a subgroup of countries I
SNE IR PO C( E M I G ) C C =∩
IR c (1,...,1) C =∈
PO 1) C ∈
´ c
c
IR PO CC ∩≠
´ c
∅
PO c (1,...,1) C =∉
P O





≠ ⊂I leads to the singleton coalition 
structure, which is not beneficial if a coalition structure is individually rational. Any deviation 
by all countries I
S=I is not profitable if a coalition structure is Pareto-optimal (Q.E.D.). 
Thus, we know that at least one element in the inclusion chain of SNE in Proposition 5 is 
none empty.
16 
4.  Summary and Final Remarks 
We analyzed coalition formation in the tradition of "new coalition theory" that has several 
advantages to former approaches. 1) The analysis is based on individual and not on aggregate 
payoffs of players. 2) Externalities among players and coalitions are fully captured. 3) A 
conceptual distinction between the rules of coalition formation and equilibrium is possible. 
                                                                                                                                                          
functions) that the aggregate payoff to a coalition is lower than the sum of coalition members´ 
payoffs in the singleton coalition structure and hence individual rationality may fail to hold. See 
the discussion in subsection 2.2. 
16    Existence of SNE in the exclusive membership G- and H-game can be established for the 
restrictive assumption of symmetric players as shown in Finus/Rundshagen (2001). However, 
even this restrictive assumption may not guarantee existence of SNE in the open membership 
games and in the exclusive membership D-game.    21
4) Coalition formation is not restricted ex-ante to a single (non-trivial) coalition and hence the 
co-existence of multiple coalition is possible. 5) Stability can be defined in terms of multiple 
deviations where deviators may form any partition they want. 
We considered six coalition games that can be interpreted as different institutional settings in 
which coalition formation takes place and/or different designs of treaty protocols. We 
compared stability in the six games under very general conditions, applying the concept of a 
Nash equilibrium and strong Nash equilibrium. We demonstrated that this is possible based 
on only one condition called positive externality property that holds in the global emission 
game without transfers but also for a large class of transfer schemes. 
Though our results are derived from a stylized model and despite results may seem obvious 
when considering the proofs, they are interesting from a policy perspective. They suggest that 
exclusive membership may be conducive to stability of IEAs. Given that almost all protocols 
of existing IEAs allow non-signatories to join an IEA at any time they want suggests altering 
this rule from open to exclusive membership for future IEAs. This basically would imply to 
turn a public good agreement into a club good agreement in terms of membership. Our results 
also suggest that a high degree of unanimity in terms of membership helps to stabilize an IEA 
whereas it is usually conjectured that unanimity leads to agreements of the lowest 
denominator type. The driving force in our model is that the higher the degree of unanimity 
required to form a coalition, the higher is the pressure on countries to accede to an agreement 
since a failure has severe consequences. Though in our model unanimity applies to 
membership and not to the level of emission reductions, our model indicates that the 
widespread application of unanimous decision rules in international politics may not always 
be a disadvantage and, in fact, may be a rational choice. In any case, our conclusion is in line 
with bargaining models that have analyzed the positive effect of unanimous decision rules in 
terms of the level of emission reduction and the policy instrument used to implement emission 
reduction targets (Endres 1997 and Finus/Rundshagen 1998a, b). 
Of course from an economic and ecological perspective it would be interesting to know what 
"more stability" means. This, however, requires more specific assumptions about payoff 
functions as this has be done for instance in the theoretical context by Finus/Rundshagen 
(2001) or in the empirical context by Eyckmans/Finus (2003) for some of the coalition games 
we discussed here. Of course, one could argue that more is always better than less stability if 
one assumes that additional equilibria in one game compared to an other game are only 
chosen by players if they lead to higher aggregate welfare and lower global emissions. 
However, this would probably be a too simple view of the problem.   22
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